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Note
A Closer Look:
Iris Recognition, Forensics, and the Future of Privacy
CHANTELLE D. ANKERMAN
The iris was first suggested for use in biometrically-based recognition of
humans over a century ago. This notion stems from clinical observations,
developmental biology, and statistical evidence that indicate the structure of
individual irises is highly distinctive and stable with age. Recent technological
advances have brought to the fore iris recognition systems with enhanced detection
capability. The current state of the art for this powerful tool allows the capture of a
moving subject's iris pattern from afar, through sunglasses, or even from a
reflection. Valuable for national security and law enforcement applications, iris
recognition provides a means of covert surveillance, and thus carries strong
implications for constitutional and public policy concerns. Several government
agencies currently employ considerable biometric databases, facilitating efficient
and inexpensive tracking. Iris recognition impacts both physical and informational
privacy, and should be construed as a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The regulatory gap should be addressed in a manner that weighs the
benefits ofsecurity against the incursions against privacy and liberty.
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A Closer Look: Iris Recognition, Forensics, and the
Future of Privacy
CHANTELLE D. ANKERMAN
INTRODUCTION
The eyes are fast becoming windows to more than one's soul. Of
particular interest is the iris, the colored part of the eye that surrounds the
pupil.' Iris recognition is an authentication technique that falls under a
branch of science known as biometrics.2 Biometrics is the use of technology
for identification or verification of people by their physical or behavioral
characteristics. 3 Biometric systems are based on algorithms that analyze
abstracted pattern representations of human characteristics, 4 such as the iris
pattern. The concept behind biometrics-human recognition by
individualization of fixed measurements or physical characteristics-is not
new.' However, "only three of the physical characteristics and personal traits
currently used for biometrics are considered truly consistent and unique: the
retina, the iris and fingerprints."' Among these "high biometrics,"' only the
iris has the potential to surpass the retina and fingerprints in terms of speed,
reliability, and accuracy in authentication-all whilst remaining non-
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2017; University of Connecticut, B.S. Physiology
& Neurobiology 2004. 1 would like to thank my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review for their
meticulous editing of this Note. I am also grateful to Judge Michael Sheldon and Dr. Al Harper, whose
wonderful Legal Forensics class inspired and shaped my work. Many thanks to Professor John Daugman
for graciously allowing me to use his high-definition lrisScans and IrisCodes, and also to the talented Dr.
Megan Foldenauer who provided the medical illustrations herein. I owe my success to the boundless love
and support of my family, especially my husband Justin, and my mom, Pam. I dedicate this Note to my
darling son Griflyn, the apple of my eye.
IFREDERIC H. MARTINI ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF ANATOMY & PHYSIOLOGY 542 (5th ed. 2001).
2 Stephen Hoffman, Biometrics, Retinal Scanning, and the Right to Privacy in the 21st Century, 22
SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 38, 39 (2010).
3 Id.
4 Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 656-57 (2003).
s Alphonse Bertillon, a policeman from Paris, studied body mechanics in an effort to identify
criminals in 1892, writing his discoveries in Tableau des nuances de l'iris humain. See generally
Alphonse Bertillion, Tableau des Nuances de L'iris Humain, in 3 BULLETINS DE LA SOCIETt
D'ANTHROPOLOGIE DE PARIS 384-87 (1892).
' John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns-Drafting the
Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 100 (1997).
For the purposes of this Note, "high biometrics" is defined as "biometric technologies
distinguished by high accuracy and which currently have functional working systems fully deployed."
Id. at 102.
intrusive.' This is due in large part to the high degrees of randomness and
immutability inherent to the structure of the iris itself.' Because of the
implications iris recognition technology has for national security and law
enforcement, constitutional and public policy concerns need to be addressed.
The purpose of this Note is to inform and equip the legal community to
understand and apply this powerful tool, while preserving privacy rights.
I. WHAT IS THE IRIS AND HOW IS IT "SCANNED"?
A. The Biology
Commonly known as the colored portion of the eye, the iris is a highly
vascularized and pigmented contractile structure comprised of layers of
connective and muscle tissue.'o Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the gross
and fine anatomy of the human iris, respectively.
8 See id. at 104 ("Iris recognition stands out as perhaps the most 'hygienic' of the biometric
technologies in that no part of the user's body has to touch anything to operate the system."). Retinal
scanning is impractical as a forensic tool because it requires close physical contact with the scanning
device and causes trauma to the eye. Id. at 103. Further, certain diseases can change the retinal vascular
structure, which undermines the results of retinal scanning. Id. Disadvantages of fingerprint scanning
include the need for physical contact, the difficulty in acquiring high quality images, and the erosion of
the fingerprint over a person's lifespan. Id. at 105.
9 See Richard P. Wildes, Iris Recognition: An Emerging Biometric Technology, 85 PROC. IEEE
1348, 1348-50 (1997) (discussing why no two people's irises are ever the same).
10 MARTINI ET AL., supra note 1.
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FIGuRE 1: ANTERIOR AND CROSS-SECTIONAL VIEW OF THE HUMAN EYE
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FIGURE 2: IRIS TRANSVERSE SECTION AND CLOSE-UP ANTERIOR WEDGE*
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The iris begins to form before birth, around the third month of
gestation." The only internal organ that is externally visible,1 2 the iris
presents a unique opportunity for biometric identification. This is because
the iris contains a superfluity of randomly distributed immutable structures,
which do not change appreciably over time.' 3 These complex random
patterns include various identifying features such as the trabecular
meshwork of connective tissue, collagenous stromal fibers, ciliary
processes, arching ligaments, radial and contraction furrows, vasculature,
pits, filaments, striation, ridges, crypts, rings, freckles, a corona, and a zigzag
collarette.1 4 Further, the iris pattern cannot be modified by surgery or other
means without a high risk of damage to one's vision.'s Together, the
singularity and dichotomous anatomy of the iris render it an ideal biometrics
modality: it is static, easy to detect, and difficult to counterfeit.' 6
The iris's individuality also results from the anomalous manner in which
it takes form. The structure of the iris is not determined by one's genetic
constitution (genotype), but rather is the product of phenotype-the physical
expression of features resulting from the continuous interaction of genes
with the environment.' 7 Epigenetics, or genetic control by factors other than
" Robyn Moo-Young, "Eyeing" the Future: Surviving the Criticisms ofBiometric Authentication,
5 N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 430 n.92 (2001).
12 John Daugman, Anatomy and Physiology of the Iris, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE COMPUTER LAB.
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-jgdl000/anatomy.html [https://perma.ce/6DVA-G8NF] (last visited Feb. 8,
2017).
" Wildes, supra note 9, at 1348-49. One exception is iris coloration, which often changes over an
individual's lifetime, but does not interfere with iris recognition, which can utilize either visible
wavelength or near-infrared light to obtain images. Id. at 1349, 1353.
14 John Daugman, Iris Recognition, 89 AM. SCIENTIST 326, 328 (2001); John G. Daugman, High
Confidence Visual Recognition ofPersons by a Test ofStatistical Independence, 15 IEEE TRAN SACTIONS
ON PATrERN ANALYSIS & MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 1148, 1148 (1993) [hereinafter Daugman, Visual
Recognition].
" Daugman, Visual Recognition, supra note 14, at 1148.
16 JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS: IDENTIFYING AND
ADDRESSING SOCIOCULTURAL CONCERNS 9 (2001) ("[Biometrics are] any measurable, robust,
distinctive, physical characteristic or personal trait of an individual that can be used to identify, or verify
the claimed identity of, that individual.").
" John Daugman, Phenotypic Versus Genotypic Approaches to Face Recognition, in FACE
RECOGNITION: FROM THEORY TO APPLICATION 108-23, 110 n.l (Harry Wechsler et al. eds. 1998).
I3632017]
the DNA sequence,18 can turn genes on or off. 9 This extra-genetic
manipulation of DNA expression explains why genetically identical twins
are often phenotypically distinguishable.20 In other words, there is a
continuum of genetic penetrance,2 1 and certain biological characteristics
(like iris structure) fall on the phenotypically determined end of the
spectrum.22
According to John Daugman, considered by some to be the foremost
authority on iris recognition, 23 "[t]o maximize individuality, distinctiveness,
and randomness, a biometric feature should be entirely epigenetic. To
maximize stability over the life span . . . [it] should not change with
" Ian C G Weaver et al., Epigenetic Programming by Maternal Behavior, 7 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 847, 852 (2004) (discussing the epigenetic effect of maternal behavior on DNA
expression). The researchers further explained that
maternal behavior produces stable alterations of DNA methylation and chromatin
structure, providing a mechanism for the long-term effects of maternal care on gene
expression in the offspring. These . . . gene-environment interactions during
development ... result in the sustained 'environmental programming' of gene
expression and function over the lifespan. . .. Epigenetic modification of targeted
regulatory [DNA] sequences in response to even reasonably subtle variations in
environmental conditions might [] serve as a major source of epigenetic variation in
gene expression and function, and ultimately as a process mediating such maternal
effects... . [E]ffects on [DNA] structure ... serve as an intermediate process that
imprints dynamic environmental experiences on the fixed genome, resulting in stable
alterations in phenotype.
Id.
19 See Danielle Simmons, Epigenetic Influences and Disease, SCITABLE,
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/epigenetic-influences-and-disease-895 [https://perma.cc/
TF9J-ZN4X] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (discussing how DNA can be "silenced" by various chemical
alterations to its structure, including methylation, histone, and RNA modification).
20 See Insights from Identical Twins, LEARN.GENETICS: GENETIC SC. LEARNING CTR.,
http://learn.genetics.utah.edulcontent/epigenetics/twins/ [https://perma.cc/M9YN-C9SG] (last visited
Mar. 13, 2017) ("Because identical twins develop from a single fertilized egg, they have the same
genome. So any differences between twins are due to their environments, not genetics. Recent studies
have shown that many environmentally induced differences are reflected in the epigenome."). Medical
knowledge is replete with examples of phenotypic differences between monozygotic (identical) twins,
among them schizophrenia and autism. Albert H.C. Wong et al., Phenotypic Difference in Genetically
Identical Organisms: The Epigenetic Perspective, 14 HUMAN MOLECULAR GENETICS 11, 1[-12 (2005).
Genetics may provide the palette, but epigenetics determines how much of each color to use in creating
an individual's portrait. Id. at 14.
21 Genetic penetrance is defined as the extent to which a feature is heritable, or determined by
genetic factors. John Daugman, Genetic Penetrance and Iris Recognition, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE
COMPUTER LAB., http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-jgdl000/genetics.html [https://perma.cc/UW7M-SQY5]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2017) ("Eye colour ... has high genetic penetrance,... but ... textural details [of
iris structure] are uncorrelated and independent even in genetically identical [eye] pairs.").
22 id.
23 See, e.g., Interview: John Daugman, PLANET BIOMETRICS, http://www.planetbiometrics.com/
article-details/i/4542/desc/interview-john-daugman/ [https://perma.cc/PCA8-FSJD] (June 22, 2016)
("[Daugman] is the inventor of iris recognition, and his algorithms are the basis of all public operational
deployments of this biometric technology around the world.").
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phenotypic development."24 Unlike other high biometrics, the iris meets this
exacting standard.25 An expedient illustration of this principle is that a pair
of genetically identical eyes (from a single person) has a left and right iris
structure as discernable from each other as from those belonging to different
individuals.2 6
Iris structure is purely epigenetic and, once formed, remains remarkably
constant over a lifetime. 27 The iris's distinctiveness and stability have been
established through two main sources of evidence: clinical observations and
developmental biology.28 Extensive clinical studies conducted by
ophthalmologists and anatomists have demonstrated that iris pattern is
highly distinctive.29 Also, in cases of repeated observations over a subject's
lifetime, iris pattern has been shown to vary little past childhood.3 0
Developmental evidence has revealed the innately random formation of iris
pattern, which forecloses naturally occurring duplicates.3 1 Although the
general structure and color of the iris are genetically determined, the
morphogenesis of its finely detailed structure is critically dependent on
environmental conditions.32 Developmental biology has also confirmed that
a healthy iris remains mostly unchanged for life past adolescence.33
These inherent physical aspects of iris structure directly bear on the iris's
biometric value. Scientists and analysts objectively determine biometric
efficacy in terms of "robustness and distinctiveness."34 The robustness of a
24 Daugman, supra note 21.
25 See Woodward, supra note 6, at 102-05 (discussing how both fingerprints and retinal vascular
patterns, although highly unique, are subject to a large degree of alteration over a person's lifetime, while
the iris remains the same). For example, fingerprints can wear down from extensive manual labor, and
retinal vascular patterns can become distorted by various medical conditions, such as pregnancy,
diabetes, or retinal degeneration. Id. at 103, 105, 115; see also John Daugman, How Iris Recognition
Works, 14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS CIRCUITS & SYS. VIDEO TECH. 21, 21 (2004) ("[T]he ease of localizing
eyes in faces, and the distinctive annular shape of the iris, facilitate reliable and precise isolation of this
feature and the creation of a size-invariant representation.").
26 Daugman, supra note 25, at 24-25.
27 Woodward, supra note 6, at 103-04.
28 Wildes, supra note 9, at 1349.
29 Id; see also John Daugman and Cathryn Downing, Epigenetic Randomness, Complexity and
Singularity ofHuman Iris Patterns, 268 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y LOND. 1737, 1737 (2001) (discussing the
results of a study they conducted "to assess the randomness and singularity of iris patterns, and their
phenotypic distinctiveness as biometric identifiers"). To accomplish this, Daugman and Downing
digitized human iris images acquired over a three-year period from volunteers at kiosks throughout the
United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. Id.
o Wildes, supra note 9, at 1349.
31 Id.
32 Id. Although certain parts of the iris are formed at birth (e.g., vasculature) others (e.g.,
musculature) mature around two years of age, while changes in pigmentation and average pupil size
continue through adolescence. Id.
33 Id. However, slight iris depigmentation and shrinking of the average pupillary opening are
standard with advanced age. Id. Various eye diseases and environmental contaminants can also alter iris
appearance, though these conditions are rare. Id.
3 Hoffman, supra note 2, at 45.
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system is based on the false-reject rate or the probability that two data sets
from the same person will not match.35 Conversely, a system's
distinctiveness is measured by its false-accept rate, which is the probability
that two data sets from different persons will match.3 6 In this manner, a
biometric system's quality is normalized over a population.3 7 Because about
1% of persons have an identical twin, there is a minimum false-accept rate
of 1% across a population." Also, the tendency for some biometric features
to change over time creates a minimum false-reject rate. 9 However, for iris
structure, robustness is not limited by incidence of identical twins due to the
lack of genetic penetrance, and distinctiveness is not limited because of the
low incidence of significant alteration over a person's lifetime. Because of
this ideal combination of characteristics, the iris presents a unique
opportunity for biometric applications.
B. The Technology
Iris recognition works by capturing a detailed image of the iris pattern,
which is then converted into a digital code and stored in a database until
subsequent retrieval for comparison and matching purposes.4 0 Although it
sounds straightforward, this process involves several fairly complicated
steps. To surmount this complexity, this Section will examine the procedure
in five sequential parts: 1) Scanning of the iris, also known as enrollment; 2)
Conversion of the scanned iris image into a digital code; 3) Storage of the
code in a database; 4) Comparison of the code with other templates
previously stored in the database; and 5) An automated decision process that
interprets comparison results.4 1
1. Enrollment
An iris scan uses near infrared (NIR) light to detect and take a high-
" Id. False-reject rate, or the failure to detect a valid match, "is known as Type I error and is
important in determining the accuracy of the system to a particular level of statistical significance." Id.
3 Id. False-accept rate, or the incorrect matching of two templates, is known as Type 11 error, which
is "instrumental in determining the reliability of the method across a population." Id
" Id.
3 Daugman, supra note 21. This is known as a biometric's genotypic-error rate, which undermines
variability between classes. Id.
31 Id. This is known as the biometric's phenotypic-error rate, which increases variability within a
class. Id.
4 Lauren D. Adkins, Biometrics: Weighing Convenience and National Security Against Your
Privacy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 541, 545 (2006).
41 See Bill Siuru, Iris Recognition Systems, 70 ELEC. Now 41, 41-42 (1999) (stating that all
biometric techniques involve the basic steps of enrollment, feature extraction and conversion to a
mathematical code, storage as a template, and comparison with a future sample for identification or
verification purposes).
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resolution photo of patterns in the colored tissue surrounding the pupil.4 2 To
capture rich details, imaging systems must resolve a minimum of seventy
pixels in the iris radius, but a radius of 80-130 pixels is typical.43
Monochrome CCD" digital cameras acquire frames of 480-by-640 pixel
resolution using NIR illumination in the 700-900 nanometer wavelength
band, which permits imperceptible subject imaging.45 CCD cameras contain
a dense array of independent sensors, which convert incident photons into a
charge proportional to the light energy detected.46
Even darkly pigmented irises reveal complex textural structure under
NIR light.4 7 The images in Figure 3 below show the iris captured by a CCD
camera using NIR light. A wide-angle camera is used to locate the eyes, and
then a narrow-angle pan/tilt camera is used to acquire high-resolution iris
images. 48 Current iris-scanning systems can locate the iris in under a
second.49 Once in focus, the image is analyzed to find the precise location of
the iris's boundaries.o Image disruption caused by pupils, eyelashes,
eyelids, and reflections is corrected." Most glasses, contact lenses, types of
eye surgery, and even blindness do not preclude an accurate iris scan.5 2
See Daugman, Visual Recognition, supra note 14, at 328-29 (describing iris anatomy, coloration,
and pattern visualization); Wildes, supra note 9, at 1360-61 ("The main functional components of extant
iris- recognition systems consist of image acquisition, iris localization, and pattern matching.").
1 Daugman, supra note 25, at 22. The term "pixel" is a portmanteau of "picture" and "elements."
Portmanteau, ENGLISH WORD INFO., http://wordinfo.info/unit/3858/ip:13/il:P [https://perma.cc/9SP5-
65AA] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
' A CCD (charge coupled device) is a sensor for capturing images digitally, by converting light
into an electric charge, which then creates electronic signals. What is a CCD?, SPECTRAL INSTRUMENTS
INC., http://www.specinst.com/What Is_A CCD.html [https://perma.cc/V9GP-3Q44] (last visited Mar.
13, 2017). "In a CCD sensor, every pixel's charge is transferred through a very limited number of output
nodes (often just one) to be converted to voltage, buffered, and sent off-chip as an analog signal. All of
the pixel can be devoted to light capture, and the output's uniformity (a key factor in image quality) is
high." CCD v. CMOS, TELEDYNEDALSA, http://www.teledynedalsa.com/imaging/knowledge-
center/appnotes/ccd-vs-cmos/ [https://perma.cc/ 4FM8-UCWG ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
" Daugman, supra note 25, at 22.
46 JOHN DAUGMAN, COMPUTER VISION: COMPUTER SCIENCE, PART II: 16 LECTURES 8 (2014),
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/teaching/1314/CompVision/CompVisNotes2Ol4.pdf. [https://perma.cc/X9XN
-Q4E4].
' Daugman, supra note 25, at 22.
48Id.
so Id.
s Wildes, supra note 9, at 1353-54. Additionally, iris image differences resulting from image
acquisition conditions, such as distance, magnification, pupil size, iris location and orientation (which
depends on head tilt, eye rotation, and camera angles) can all be mathematically corrected for. Daugman,
supra note 25, at 25.
52 Adkins, supra note 40, at 545.
2017] 1367
CONNECTICUT LAWREVIEW
FIGURE 3: HIGH-RESOLUTION NEAR-INFRARED IRIS PHOTOS****
'ADIOS 0=I2N iitt4.
Reproduced with permission of Professor John Daugman, Ph.D.
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The digital video camera then maps the iris using landmark features
called discriminators." Although fingerprints and iris patterns are equally
unique, iris scans are more reliable because they contain more
discriminators.54 A fingerprint has about thirty-five discriminators that must
match up, while an iris scan has about 260."* Also, iris scanners can
determine "liveness" by detecting physiological response to light and natural
pupillary oscillation, which a photo cannot duplicate. 6 Iris recognition
involves multiple scans to verify that the eye is indeed moving."
Although iris scanning requires that the eye be properly positioned and
held in focus, 8 optical systems are rapidly lowering minimum image capture
requirements." Current "iris-at-a-distance" and "iris-on-the-move" systems
have been developed with a capture volume of nearly a cubic meter, and a
capture speed of walking at one meter per second, enabling throughput rates
s See supra Section L.A (listing several identifyring structural features of the iris).
5 Moo-Young, supra note 11, at 430.
55 Id
56 Id
57 Id
s' Daugman, supra note 25, at 22. Because of the way iris images are encoded, even poorly focused
irises cannot be confused when their phase codes are compared, whereas poorly resolved faces that look
alike may be confused. Id at 23.
5 Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1576 (2010).
of one person every second.o Even though there is an upper limit to the
practical range of iris scanning technology,' the bottom line is that accurate
images of multiple moving subjects can be captured quickly and
surreptitiously from several meters away.
SRI International released its "Iris on the Move*" (IOM) technology to
the public about five years ago.62 IOM systems work by capturing an iris
image at a distance while the subject is in motion.63 SRI describes IOM as a
fast, safe, convenient, non-invasive, nearly automatic, and high-throughput
identity verification solution.' The IOM technology is offered in multiple
product configurations; IOM PassPortM, IOM N-Glance', and IOM
RapiD-Cam II.' However, the IOM PassPort product has the greatest
implications for personal privacy concerns.
The SRI IOM Product Guide describes PassPort:
Ideal for high-traffic applications ... this walk-through portal
has a processing speed of 30 people per minute. Users simply
walk through at a comfortable pace. The PassPort comes in an
indoor or outdoor configuration. In addition to identity
verification, [these] systems perform onboard subject
enrollment. It is an effective solution for applications that
require rapid identity verification of a large number of
people.66
Indeed, the common perception that iris recognition technology requires
gazing directly into a scanner mere inches away has quietly become
outdated. SRI now markets iris recognition as a mature technology obviating
the previous need for close-up cameras, standing still for a scan, removing
headgear and eyewear, and ideal image-capture conditions." SRI claims that
its technology is accurate regardless of whether subjects are wearing
sunglasses, and is reliable under all lighting conditions.6 ' This technology is
available on the open market, and is promoted by SRI for law enforcement,
60 John Daugman, History of Iris Recognition, www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-jgdlOOO/history.html
[https://perma.cc/BX2H-7V9A] (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
61 See id. ("[T]he need to project enough radiant light safely onto the target to overcome its inverse
square-law dilution is a limitation.").
62 SRI INT'L, IRIS ON THE MOVE@ PRODUCT GUIDE: IRIS RECOGNITION AT A
DISTANCE AND ON THE MOVE (2012), https://www.sri.com/sites/default/files/brochures/iom-Product_g
uide_0.pdf. [https://perma.cc/4WBZ-XL7J].
63 Id.
id.
65 Id.
66 id.
67 SRI INT'L, IRIS RECOGNITION BROCHURE 1, 2 (2014),
https://www.sri.com/sites/default/files/brochures/sri-future-iris-recognition.pdf fhttps://perma.cc/
YG67-YRLU].
68 Id.
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healthcare, and banking applications, to name only a few possible uses."
Also, in 2015, SRI announced an exclusive license of IOM to Samsung for
use in its mobile products. 70 Thus, iris recognition is rapidly becoming
mainstream technology, yet the general public remains largely unaware that
large-scale deployment is already in motion.
2. Conversion
Once an image of the eye has been acquired, the next step is to localize
the portion of the image that contains the iris. This is done through a standard
machine vision technique for modeling image boundary contours, involving
the use of edge detection algorithms followed by a Hough transformation.7 '
Essentially, image-processing software employs these mathematical
functions to isolate the iris by mapping two circles, one at its inner boundary
(between the pupil and the iris) and the other at its outer boundary (between
the iris and the sclera).72
69 Id. at 3-8.
o SRI International to Offer Iris Biometric-Embedded Products for Mobile B2B Applications, SRI
INT'L (Mar. 25, 2015)), https://www.sri.com/newsroom/press-releases/sri-international-offer-iris-
biometric-embedded-products-mobile-b2b [https://perma.cc/2ZEW-CZUA]. Also, "SRI has entered into
a supply agreement to start production and sales of the IOM technology-embedded Samsung mobile
products for B2B [business to business] applications. The initial product . . . will be a customized
Samsung Galaxy Tab Pro 8.4 tablet with a built-in IOM iris module." Id.
7 Wildes, supra note 9, at 1355; see also D.H. Ballard & C.M. Brown, COMPUTER VISION I19-24
(1982) (describing the Hough method of curve detection when localizing image boundaries); W.K.
PRATT, DIGITAL IMAGE PROCESSING 569-78 (3d ed. 1978) (describing the Duda and Hart versions of
the Hough transform as a means of edge linking in boundary detection); P.V.C. Hough, Method and
Means for Recognizing Complex Patterns, U.S. Patent No. 3,069,654 col. 5, 11. 70-75, col. 6, 11. 1-2
(filed Mar. 25, 1960) (issued Dec. 18, 1962) (claiming "[a] method of analyzing a complex pattern in a
picture comprising dividing said picture into framelets, said framelets sized so that any segment of said
complex pattern therewith is essentially a straight line, transforming each of said elements into a plane
transform and reading the coordinate position data of each plane transform."); J. Illingworth & J. Kittler,
A Survey of the Hough Transform, 44 COMPUTER VISION, GRAPHICS, AND IMAGE PROCESSING 87, 87-
116 (1988) (reviewing the emergence, development, and application of the Hough transform to image
processing and computer vision). The Hough transform is a feature-extraction technique used in image
analysis, computer vision, and digital image processing. LINDA SHAPIRO & GEORGE STOCKMAN,
COMPUTER VISION 330-41 (2000). The Hough transform was originally used for identification of image
lines, but was later expanded for use in identifying the position of arbitrary shapes, including circles and
ellipses. Id The modem Hough transform was invented by Richard Duda and Peter Hart in 1972, who
called it a "generalized Hough transform" after the related 1962 Hough patent. R.O. Duda & P.E. Hart,
Use of the Hough Transformation to Detect Lines and Curves in Pictures, 15 COMM. ACM 11, 11-15
(1972). The Hough transform was popularized in the computer vision community by Dana Ballard. See
generally D.H. Ballard, Generalizing the Hough Transform to Detect Arbitrary Shapes, 13 PATTERN
RECOGNITION Ill, 111-22 (1981) (describing the extrapolation of the Hough transform from binary
edge images to arbitrarily complex shapes).
72 See supra Figure 1 (indicating the location and relative positions of the iris, sclera and pupil of
the human eye). The inner, pupillary boundary is relatively easy to detect, because it is generally circular
and there is a striking contrast where the pupil meets the iris, whereas in finding the outer, limbic
boundary, one must correct for potential eyelid obscuration of the iris. Biometric Pers. Identification Sys.
Based on Iris Analysis, U.S. Patent No. 5,291,560 (filed July 15, 1991) (issued Mar. 1, 1994).
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Next, further algorithms are used to compensate for image shift, scaling
and rotation, conforming each newly localized iris image to the spatial
alignment necessary for comparison to other templates. Specifically,
mathematical functions called 2D Gabor wavelets are used to filter and map
the iris pattern.74 This family of functions was originally proposed as a
framework for understanding the properties of neurons in the brain's visual
cortex. 75 2D Gabor wavelets can optimally extract information about image
orientation, modulation, and position while achieving the theoretical lower
limit of mathematical uncertainty. 76 Because of their capacity for compact
representation, 2D Gabor wavelets have become standard in computer vision
image analysis.n
Finally, polar coordinates (concentric circles and radial lines from their
origin78 ) are superimposed onto the localized iris image to define separate
analysis zones, so that key features can be accurately located and compared
in two-dimensional space. 79 This technique corrects for changes in the iris
as the pupil grows (dilates) and shrinks (constricts) in different light
conditions, or due to natural oscillation.o
The pattern of light and dark areas in the localized iris image is
converted into digital form using bandpass filters (if the brightness in a given
area is more than a certain threshold amount, the software registers a one,
otherwise it registers a zero).8 ' The resulting binary code of the localized,
aligned and mapped iris image is then used to generate a unique 512-digit
number called an IrisCode.82 The conversion of a raw image into an IrisCode
takes less than a second." As Figure 4 illustrates below, an IrisCode looks
similar to a barcode or QR code, and is used to digitally store information
" Wildes, supra note 9, at 1356.
7 John Daugman, Information Theory and the IrisCode, 11 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO.
FORENSICS & SEC. 400, 401 (2016). 2D Gabor wavelets are mathematical functions that act as filters to
aid visual pattern recognition; they allow extraction, representation, and analysis of images, and provide
information on orientation, modulation, and position. DAUGMAN, supra note 46, at 37.
7 DAUGMAN, supra note 46, at 37. 2D Gabor wavelets are currently the "standard model for how
the brain's visual cortex represents the information in the retinal image." Id. at 40.
76 Id. at 37. Daugman also notes that 2D Gabor wavelets are used for "motion detection,
stereoscopic vision, and many sorts of visual pattern recognition such as face recognition." Id.
" Daugman, supra note 74, at 401.
7 Polar Coordinates, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfiam.com/PolarCoordinates
.html [https://perma.cc/H8L6-J82K] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
" Biometric Pers. Identification Sys. Based on Iris Analysis, U.S. Patent No. 5,291,560 col. 2, 11.
52-68, col. 8,11. 15-20, 49-55 (filed July 15, 1991) (issued Mar. 1, 1994).
soId. at col. 9,11. 33-51, col. 10, 11. 41-42.
'Id. at col. 10, 11. 41-42, 51-63.
82 Chris Woodford, Iris Scans, EXPLAIN THAT STUFF, http://www.explainthatstuff.com/how-iris-
scans-work.html. [https://perma.cc/AHU7-7HRS] (last updated July 5, 2016).
8 Daugman, supra note 25, at 9 tbl.2.
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detected about the iris pattern. 8 4 Each IrisCode consists of about 5,000 bits
of data."
FIGURE 4: IRISCODES*
I
I
84 The iris' unique structural features are turned into a, 512-digit number called an IrisCode that is
then stored in a database alongside the subject's name and other information. Woodford, supra note 82.
" Kim Zetter, Reverse-Engineered rises Look So Real, They Fool Eye-Scanners, WIRED (July 25,
2012, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/07/reverse-engineering-iris-scans/
[https://perma.cc/66X8-EQ8U]. The bit is a basic unit of information in computing, and eight bits are
commonly referred to as a byte. Marshall Brain, How Bits and Bytes Work, How STUFF WORKS
http://www.explainthatstuff.com/how-iris-scans-work.html [https://perma.cc/ECM9-W4RP] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2017). One byte represents one character of data. Id.
Reproduced with permission of Professor John Daugman, Ph.D.
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Over twenty years ago, John Daugman patented this basis for iris
recognition and its underlying computer vision algorithms for image
processing, feature extraction, and matching." Daugman's algorithms have
been widely licensed," and after subsequent improvements, they remain the
primary basis for all significant public deployments of iris recognition,"
although research on alternative methods continues.
3. Storage
IrisCodes can be stored on a computer database and shared among
several different databases. Although IrisCodes are typically stored instead
of iris images to help maintain security and privacy and may be encrypted
for further protection, the risk of misappropriation is ever-present.89
IrisCodes have been successfully used to reverse-engineer images capable
of fooling commercial iris recognition systems.o Thus, some fear that a
recreated iris image could allow an imposter to breach border crossings or
secure facilities." However, the possibility of a replica image closely
matching authentic iris images is far greater than the practicality of
impersonation. Not only would a print-out of a reverse-engineered image be
rather conspicuous, particularly in a manually monitored scenario, even a
covertly displayed replica image (for example, printed on the surface of a
contact lens) would be unable to mimic the aforementioned pupillary
response to changing light and the natural oscillation reflex.92 These
physiological features of the eye are the touchstone of an authentic iris
image. With the ever-micreasing sophistication and sensitivity of scanning
technology, iris identity-theft remains an improbable threat.
There has also been some debate in recent years as to whether iris
patterns change with age. A handful of researchers assert that they do to a
86 Daugman, supra note 74, at figs. 1-16.
" Licensing companies include IriScan, Iridian, Sarnoff, Sensar, LG-Iris, Panasonic, Oki, B12
(maintains iris code databases for the FBI), IrisGuard, Unisys, Sagem, Enschede, Securimetrics and Ll,
owned by Safran/Morpho. Daugman, supra note 60; Zetter, supra note 85.
" Supra note 23 and accompanying text. The concept of iris recognition dates to 1936, but the
technique did not emerge until the development of Daugman's algorithms in the late 1980s. NAT'L SC.
& TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS OVERVIEW 1 (2006), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did-463909.
[https://perma.cc/KDS7-LU3G].
'9 Zetter, supra note 85. Criminals can obtain iris codes directly by scanning victims unawares, or
indirectly by hacking into a database of iris codes. Allya Sternstein, Eye on Crime: The FBI is Building
a Database of Iris Scans, NEXTGOV (June 27, 2012), http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-
tech/2012/06/eye-crime-fbi-building-database-iris-scans/56481/./ [https://perma.cc/Z4LM-PTGQ].
' Zetter, supra note 85. Researchers used a genetic algorithm (which continually improves results
over several rounds of data processing) to modify synthetic iris images until they matched real ones. Id.
After five to ten minutes of one-hundred to two-hundred iterations, the algorithm can produce a synthetic
iris image indistinguishable to a scanner from the real image. Id
91 Id.
92 See supra Section I.B.1 ("[Ilris scanners can determine 'liveness' by detecting physiological
response to light and natural pupillary oscillation, which a photo cannot duplicate.").
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statistically significant degree,9 3 while others refute their claims as
confounding algorithmic failure with alteration in iris morphology.94 But for
argument's sake, even if irises did change appreciably over relatively short
time periods (a few years, perhaps), multiple enrollments over an
individual's lifetime could easily overcome this problem. An iris template
could conceivably be updated and cross-referenced with iris templates stored
in other databases every time an individual is scanned.
There is also the issue of digital data corruption, a type of computer error
that occurs when code is intentionally or inadvertently changed from its
original, correct form." Corruption can be random and silent (i.e.,
undetected), and even small changes can destroy information.96 User error
(i.e., improper file deletion or modification), malicious activity, and physical
degradation of storage media are common sources of corruption. 97
Countermeasures such as periodic hard drive analysis and backup, antivirus
software, and hardware upgrades do exist,98 but, again, a straightforward
solution to this eventuality would be frequent re-enrollment of individuals
and re-generation of IrisCodes in order to refresh the coded data and guard
against corruption.
4. Comparison
For pattern recognition, only objects with less inter-class variability than
intra-class variability can be classified reliably.99 Because iris patterns are a
9 Sarah E. Baker et al., Empirical Evidence for Correct Iris Match Score Degradation with
Increased Time-Lapse Between Gallery and Probe Matches, in INT'L CONF. ON BIOMETRICS 1170,1170-
71 (M. Tistarelli and M.S. Nixon eds., 2009); Samuel P. Fenker & Kevin W. Bowyer, Analysis of
Template Aging in Iris Biometrics, IEEE COMPUTER SOC'Y BIOMETRICS WORKSHOP (2012); D.M.
Rankin et al., Iris Recognition Failure Over Time: The Effects of Texture, 45 PATTERN RECOGNITION
145, 148-49 (2012); P. Tome-Gonzalez et al., On the Effects of Time Variability in Iris Recognition, 2d
IEEE INT'L CONF. ON BIOMETRICS: THEORY, APPLICATIONS & SYS. 1-6 (2008); Mateusz Trokielewicz,
Linear Regression Analysis Of Template Aging In Iris Biometrics, WARSAW U. OF TECH. (2015),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e5dl/92 I df75f844de99686ee552ec4d2de6888d4.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N3W7-XKW6].
9 See John Daugman & Cathryn Downing, No Change Over Time Is Shown in Rankin et al. "Iris
Recognition Failure Over Time: The Effects of Texture," 46 PATTERN RECOGNITION 609,609-10, (2013)
(stating that encoding variations do not imply variations in the object being imaged); Hunny Mebrotra et
al., Does Iris Change Over Time?, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 3 (2013) (observing that increase in false rejection
rate is due to poor acquisition, presence of occlusion, noise, and blur).
95 Matt Smith, What Is Data Corruption and How to Prevent It, MUO (July 17, 2014),
http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/data-corruption-prevent/ [https://perma.cc/27UL-6R4T].
96 See id. ("Stray particles can literally zap a zero to a one, or vice versa, introducing random
corruption even when a computer is turned off. And if stray particles don't do the trick, simple physical
decay can. Magnetic drives lose their orientation, electrically charged media gradually lose charge, and
optical media breaks down as its plastic degrades or is damaged. In a sense, then, computers are literally
doomed to become increasingly corrupt as time goes on, and all digital storage will eventually be
ruined.").
9 Id.
D g Id.
99 Daugman, supra note 25, at 2 1.
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highly robust and distinctive biometric," different images of the same iris
vary little, while images from different irises vary significantly. IrisCodes
can be compared for either identification (i.e., one to many), or verification
(i.e, one to one).'o' A database with millions of iris pattern records can be
searched in under a second.102 Since no two images of a single iris produce
the exact same IrisCode, iris recognition systems use a similarity score to
match an IrisCode to an existing template. 103 The threshold for determining
whether an IrisCode and template are similar enough to be a match is
determined by the scanner's setting."*
The dissimilarity between IrisCodes is called the "Hamming Distance"
(HD).'0o HD is defined as the number of bits that differ between two
different lengths of code.106 Calculation of HD is a way to evaluate the
closeness of the match between IrisCodes. 10 7 Evaluating similarity requires
setting a threshold for comparison of IrisCodes: HDs below the threshold
indicate a match, and HDs above it indicate a non-match.10 8 An optimal
decision threshold (an equal probability of false-accept and false-reject
errors) is typically the point at which the two distributions (match versus
non-match) cross over.109
It is extremely improbable for two different irises to disagree in less than
about a third of their bits." 0 Because so many different iris pattern features
are distinguishable, the likelihood of two different irises generating the same
information is statistically impossible. Daugman's research revealed that
[For] 9.1 million iris comparisons . . . the smallest [HD]
observed was 0.334.... [T]he probability of such an event is
" See supra Section l.A ("These inherent physical aspects of iris structure directly bear on its
biometric value. Scientists and analysts objectively determine biometric efficacy in terms of robustness
and distinctiveness.") (footnote omitted).
'0 Daugman, supra note 25, at 23. The high confidence levels of iris recognition enable exhaustive
searching of national databases without false matches, whereas other biometrics can only survive
relatively few comparisons. Id. at 22.
102 Id. at 23. By dividing a database into units of about one-hundred-thousand persons each, and
running independent search engines in parallel, one could search national iris pattern databases with a
high level of confidence in about one second using several inexpensive central processing units
("CPUs"). Id. at 28.
' Zetter, supra note 85.
104 id.
105 Named for Richard Hamming, who introduced the concept that subsequently became
fundamental for information and coding theory, as well as cryptography. R.W. Hamming, Error
Detecting and Error Correcting Codes, 29 BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 147, 147-160 (1950).
1o P. DANZINGER, LINEAR CODES, 1, http://www.math.ryerson.ca/-danziger/professor/_MTHI 08/
Handouts/codes.pdf [https://perna.cc/4VYW-MS34] (last visited Dec. 21, 2016). For example, since
01101010 and 11011011 differ in four places, the Hamming distance d(01 101010, 11011011)= 4. Id.
'0o Wildes, supra note 9, at 1359.
109 Id
"o Daugman, supra note 25, at 24.
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about 1 in 16 million. . . . Thus, even the observation of a
relatively poor degree of match between the phase codes for
two different iris images (say, 70% agreement or HD = 0.300)
would still provide extraordinarily compelling evidence of
identity, because the test of statistical independence is still
failed so convincingly."'1
This failure of a test of statistical independence on phase structure
encoded by the 2D Gabor wavelets is the principle behind iris recognition.1 12
When comparing two different irises, the test of statistical independence is
failed when less than one-third of the bytes in the codes differ."' When
images of the same iris are compared, they fail the test-thus, paradoxically,
indicating a perfect match.114 Conversely, if the HD detected between
different images is above the set threshold, the iris-recognition system
declares the images a nonmatch."' The core theory behind Daugman's
algorithms is that the failure of a test of statistical independence is a strong
basis for pattern recognition if there is sufficiently high entropy (enough
random variation) among samples from different classes."' With a false
match rate of about one in a million, this creates an acceptable and practical
level of security.
5. Decision
The greatest strength of iris recognition is its astronomically low false-
match probability. According to Daugman, in all of the published scientific
tests of its algorithms, there has never been a single documented false
match."' He has stated, "[a]ll testing organizations have reported a false
match rate of 0 in their tests, some of which involved millions of iris
SId
112 Id. at 21. "[TIhe combinatorial complexity of this phase information across different persons
spans about 249 degrees of freedom and generates a discrimination entropy [information density] of
about 3.2 bits/mm 2 over the iris, enabling real-time decisions about personal identity with extremely high
confidence." id.
' See id. at 26 (asserting that iris recognition is primarily based on a test of statistical
independence: "Any two different irises are statistically 'guaranteed' to pass this test of independence[,]
and any two images that fail this test [i.e. produce a HID 5 0.32] must be images of the same iris").
114 See id. ("The fact that the minimum HD observed in all of these millions of rotated comparisons
was about 0.33 illustrates the extreme improbability that the phase sequences for two different irises
might disagree in fewer than a third of their bits.").
"15 Id.
116 See id. at 23 ("The key to iris recognition is the failure ofa test of statistical independence, which
involves so many degrees-of-freedom that this test is virtually guaranteed to be passed whenever the
phase codes for two different eyes are compared, but to be uniquely failed when any eye's phase code is
compared with another version of itself").
"' See Nicholas Orlans, Eye Biometrics: Iris and Retina Scanning, in BIOMETRICS 93 (2003)
(noting that iris recognition tests are "almost flawless," and that the odds of two irises generating a false
match are theoretically one in 1.2 million).
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pairings.""'s The practical effect of this extremely low probability of a false
match, given an HD50.32, is that nation-sized databases can be exhaustively
searched with a high level of confidence in the result." 9
Because of its high degree of accuracy, iris recognition is reliable for
identification as well as verification purposes. Identification is a much more
demanding process than verification, even for modest databases, thus not all
biometrics that serve adequately as verifiers have equal utility for
identification. 120 Iris recognition relies on comparison of the HD
distributions for the same versus different irises in order to decide if a match
is statistically probable.12 1 Also, the HD threshold is adaptive, meaning it
maintains the same level of certainty regardless of database size. 122
Therefore, if the search database contains one million different iris patterns,
the HD match level need only be adjusted from 0.33 to 0.27 in order to
maintain a net false match probability of 10-6 for the entire database.1 23
II. How CAN IRIS ScANs BE USED?
Although previously used mostly for high-level security,124  iris
recognition's increased economic viability and technical maturation have
rendered it broadly applicable in both the public and private sectors. Iris
recognition has already been used extensively, both domestically 25 and
abroad;1 26 the question now is, what other purposes might it be used for in
the near future? There has been a proliferation of algorithm advances and
providers since Daugman's patent expired in 2005.127 And it has been
"' Daugman, supra note 25, at 22.
19 Id. at 28.
2 0 See id. at 26-27 ("The requirements ofoperating in one-to-many 'identification' mode are vastly
more demanding than operating merely in one-to-one 'verification' mode (in which an identity must first
be explicitly asserted, [and] then verified ... by comparison against [] a single nominated template.)").
121 See id at 27 (describing how the overlap between dual distributions reveals the extent to which
they are separable and determines decision error rates and reliability).
122 id.
123 Id
124 See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 6, at 109-11 (describing how access to sensitive areas can be
secured using biometrics).
125 See, e.g., id. at 98 (noting that "the U.S. Secret Service and the General Accounting Office [have
given] biometrics a qualified endorsement as a viable means to deter fraud in government entitlements
distributed electronically").
126 See, e.g., Roger J. Chin, Gregory Hennessy & Toby Madubuko, India's Aadhaar Project: The
Unprecedented and Unique Partnership for Inclusion, 12 J. ADMIN. SCI. 1, 1-2, 5 (2015) (discussing
India's Unique Identification Authority program for identification of its 1.2 billion citizens by providing
each a unique 12-digit ID number, called an Aadhaar). Each person's Aadhaar is linked to her basic
demographic and biometric information, including fingerprint and iris scans, which are stored in a
centralized database. Id at 5. The program's slogan is "To give the poor an identity." HANDBOOK OF IRIS
RECOGNITION vii (Kevin W. Bowyer & Mark J. Burge eds., 2d ed. 2016).
127 Other advancements include: increased camera availability, lower failure to capture rates, faster
capture time, and decreased cost of data storage. NAT'L SC. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN
GOVERNMENT POST-9/ll : ADVANCING SCIENCE, ENHANCING OPERATIONS, 79 (Aug. 2008),
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observed that "[t]echnology is fast. The law ... is slow." 128 To keep up, we
must anticipate the direction in which biometrics generally, and iris
recognition in particular, are headed.
A. Identification
Biometric identification falls under two major categories: positive and
negative.1 29 Positive-identification systems test whether a submitted image
belongs to an individual already enrolled in the system.130 This serves not
only to confirm the identity of the individual, but it prevents multiple
individuals from using a single identity.131 Conversely, negative-
identification systems test whether the submitted image belongs to an
individual not already enrolled in the system.13 2 This prevents an individual
from having multiple identities in the system.' 33 Both positive and negative
identification serve the same goal: to authenticate each individual based on
a single, non-transferable identity.
Of course, not all identifications carry the same weight. For example,
iris scanning has been used all over the world as a "living passport."'3 4 It has
also been used in many countries for the proper allocation of government
benefits. Additionally, in private commercial settings, consumers may be
scanned in an effort to predict behavior based on past purchases. Sometimes,
iris recognition comes in handy for atypical situations. For example,
National Geographic used iris scanning to identify a famous Afghan girl
with haunting eyes who had been featured on the magazine's cover eighteen
years earlier.135 But for iris recognition to be used in a forensic context,
experts must demonstrate that it is the product of sound scientific
methodology and principle.
The use of iris recognition technology is widely accepted in the
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/biometrics.pdf [https://perma.cc/K79N-84D6] [hereinafter BIOMETRICS POST-
9/11].
128 ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 326 (1995) (emphasis
omitted).
129 JAMES WAYMAN ET AL., BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS 5 (2005).
130 Id Positive identification systems are typically used to control access to high-security areas or
networks. See id (describing how positive identification is used to regulate airport employee access).
131 Id.
132 Id
133 Id.
1"' Iris Biometrics: Living Passport for Airport Access Control, IRITECH (May 30, 2015)
http://www.iritech.com/blog/biometric-airport-access-control/ [https://perma.cc/W7QZ-H7CR] ("[Iris
recognition is considered [] the most effective biometric[] to ensure security and expedite airport
operations.. . .").
1 35 See David Braun, How They Found National Geographic's "Afghan Girl", NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2003), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/03/ 0311_020312_sharbat.html
[https://perma.cc/58TZ-NQXE] (describing how the National Geographic team verified her identity).
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scientific community as a valid method for human authentication.1 6 Like all
reputable biometrics, iris scanning is based on the scientific method.137
Under the Frye standard, forensic evidence could be presented as long as the
underlying theory was "generally accepted." 38 However, the codification of
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,139 and the Supreme
Court's subsequent determination that Article VII legislatively overruled
Frye,4 o yielded a more demanding standard for experts presenting scientific
evidence.14 ' Under the Daubertl4 2 standard, expert testimony given
regarding forensic science and biometrics is admissible when it has
sufficient safeguards of reliability and relevance. 143
The reason behind this caution in admitting expert biometric testimony
is the tendency for laymen to have unsubstantiated faith in anything deemed
"scientific."'" Although this Note has established that iris recognition is a
reliable and accurate technique, 4 5 it has also acknowledged that it is
vulnerable to fraud and human error.'" Although not a complete indictment,
we must continuously ensure that our trust in biometrics is well founded.
The cost of failing to do so exceeds the benefit, considering "[t]he difficulty
of challenging a false biometric reading and the potential for [resulting]
improper assumptions . . . particularly . . . given the settings in which
biometrics are likely to be used."'4 7
' Hoffman, supra note 2, at 41.
13 Id.
'3 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("Just when a scientific principle
or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.") (emphasis added).
"9 FED. R. EVID. 702-03.
'" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
'' Hoffman, supra note 2, at 42.
142 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
'41 Id. at 593-94 (listing empirical testing, peer review and publication, known or potential rate of
error, standards and controls, and degree of general acceptance by the relevant scientific community as
non-exclusive factors relevant in establishing the validity of scientific testimony).
144 See James L. Wayman, When Bad Science Leads to Good Law: The Disturbing Irony of the
Daubert Hearing in the Case of U.S. v. Byron C. Mitchell (Feb. 2, 2000),
http://kryminalistyka.wpia.uw.edu.pl/files/2012/10/dakt2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TAS-NJ7N]
(commenting on unfounded and misleading probability-based arguments, and noting a history of human
identification jurisprudence based on the misuse of statistical and probability theory).
"o See supra Section I.B.iv.
'" See supra Section I.B.v.
147 Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 666 (2003). The liberty of a criminal defendant, although protected
somewhat by due process, is at stake. Therefore, iris recognition, or any biometric technology, must be
subject to a high level of legal scrutiny.
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B. Surveillance
For some, iris scanning raises the specter of government tracking,
particularly because an iris image need not be voluntarily provided. The fear
that government agents will be able to monitor individuals by mass
collection of biometric data is not without reason. Powerful biometrics, such
as iris scanning, do make identification easier, and unlike a credit card
number, an iris pattern is not easily reissued. This explains why "[stealing]
biometric information amounts to permanent identity theft."l 48 Non-
biometric tracking is already done on a large scale,1 49 but the greater concern
is that once an individual is enrolled in a database, there are few ways to
discreetly evade detection.5 o
The fact that iris scans can be collected without knowledge or consent
presents an ideal opportunity for would-be surveillants. Since a person
cannot change his or her iris pattern without risking blindness,"' the
potential exists for iris recognition to substantially facilitate tracking beyond
the capacity of even other biometrics. This is due in large part to the "nearly
instantaneous data sharing" that current biometric technological and
communication advances allow.' 5 2 This explains why "biometrics have
become increasingly instrumental in enforcing criminal and immigration
law, detecting persons known to pose a threat to public safety and national
security, and preventing fraud."'53
As the paragon of all law enforcement and intelligence organizations,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has long had an interest in biometrics.
But following the 9/11 attacks, that interest grew into a national obsession.
To help "increase the range and quality" of its "biometric identification
capabilities" the FBI launched three biometric initiatives: Next Generation
Identification (NGI), Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), and the
Biometric Center of Excellence (BCOE). 15 4 Government funding for
biometrics research has also proliferated after 9/11.i Some of these funds
' Steven C. Bennett, Privacy Implications ofBiometrics, 53 PRAC. L. 13, 17 (2007).
149 See, e.g., Mariko Hirose, Documents Uncover NYPD's Vast License Plate Reader Database,
AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 25, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-
future/documents-uncover-nypds-vast-license-plate-reader-database [https://perma.cc/P42P-GMG9]
(discussing how the New York City Police Department contracted with the company Vigilant Solutions
to gain access to a nationwide database of its private license plate reader information).
"s Supra note 67, at 2 (noting that eyeglasses, contact lenses, and sunglasses do not obscure an
individual's iris pattern).
151 Daugman, Visual Recognition, supra note 14, at 1148.
152 Achraf Farraj, Refugees and the Biometric Future: The Impact of Biometrics on Refugees and
Asylum Seekers, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 891, 894 (2011).
153 Id
154 Fingerprints and Other Biometrics, FBI, https://fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-
biometrics [https://perma.cc/FDW7-4PHW] (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
' See BIOMETRICS POST-9/1 1, supra note 127, at 17-18 (("[Although] the U.S. government funded
iris recognition research for several years prior to 9/11 . . . [t]o improve the utility, performance, and
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took the form of federal sponsorship of academic programs to foster rapid
development of iris biometric technology.`6 The result is a swiftly evolving
state of art and interoperability.
Iris recognition and other biometrics become even more powerful when
the database becomes larger and is shared among several governmental
agencies-the more people enrolled in a system and the more people that
have access to that system, the fewer places there are left to hide. At a certain
point, mere non-enrollment of an individual may be sufficient cause for
suspicion and subsequent investigation.
C. Security
Iris recognition has readily apparent applications for maintaining
security interests. The FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)
Division developed and integrated NGI to replace the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). 157 The FBI describes NGI as "the
world's largest and most efficient electronic repository of biometric and
criminal history information.""' Indeed, the quantity and breadth of
identifying information in the NGI system is unprecedented.15 9 The FBI
describes its NGI system as "a platform for multimodal functionality that
will continue to evolve with new technologies and user requirements."'6"
The impetus behind pushing these boundaries is nebulously framed as a
response to "growing threats."'6 '
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. government had already begun to develop
automated, multimodal systems for identifying people at a distance for
ease-of-use ... [it] substantially increased its investment after 9/11."). Advancements such as increased
standoff distances, improved system performance (through reduced size and cost), and enhanced moving
image acquisition capability were the result of such increased funding. Id
156 Id Some of these developments include: analysts' tools to augment automated iris match
algorithms, and multiple matching algorithms, including government-owned algorithms. Id.
"' See Next Generation Identification (NGI), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-
and-other-biometrics/ngi [https://perma.cc/7H57-ZJQ6] (last visited Oct. 30, 2016) (describing how the
implementation ofNGI increased the completeness, efficiency, and accuracy of biometric identification
services previously accessible through IAFIS).
158 Id.
159 See NAT'L SCi. TECH. COUNCIL SUBCOMM. BIOMETRICS IDENTITY MGMT., National Biometrics
Challenge, 5, 16 (Sept. 2011) (discussing how NGI supports even higher performance levels and activity
volumes than IAFIS); NGI Officially Replaces 1IFIS-Yields More Search Options and Investigative
Leads, and Increased Identification Accuracy, CJIS LINK (Oct. 24, 2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/cjis-link/ngi-officially-replaces-iafis-yields-more-search-options-and-
investigative-leads-and-increased-identification-accuracy [https://perma.cc/JE5V-NJZ7] (listing
additional capabilities of the NGI system, including "a national Rap Back service; the Interstate Photo
System; text-based searches for images of scars, marks, and tattoos; fingerprint verification services;
more complete and accurate identity records; and enhancements to the biometric identification
repository.").
.60 Supra note 158.
161 Id
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protection and early warning. 162 One such program, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA)'s Human Identification at a Distance
(HumaniD) program, which began in September of 2000, provided the
scientific foundation for human identification at a distance, including iris
recognition.'6 ' After 9/11, the Department of Defense (DoD) expanded the
role of the Biometrics Management Office (BMO) and Biometrics Fusion
Center (BFC) beyond evaluating biometrics as a way to secure American
facilities and networks.' 6"
In 2004, the DoD deployed its Automated Biometric Identification
System (ABIS), a database compatible with IAFIS, to provide centralized
storage for military-collected biometric data. 165 In 2005, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Intelligence Technology Innovation
Center (ITIC) co-sponsored a study of iris recognition accuracy, utility, and
interoperability, known as Independent Testing of Iris Recognition
Technology (ITIRT).' 66 Also, from 2005 to 2006, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted the Iris Challenge Evaluation
(ICE), a two-phase "large-scale, open independent technology evaluation for
iris recognition . .. to promote [its] development and. . . assess its state-of-
the-art capability."l6 7 In September of 2013, the FBI deployed an iris
recognition pilot program to evaluate existing technology, address
challenges, and develop a capable system.' 6 8
The creation of a comprehensive database is a logical precursor to
maximizing the utility of iris biometrics. Although the FBI claims that ABIS
and other biometric platforms are necessary tools in identifying known or
suspected terrorists,1 69 it remains unclear whether widespread deployment
162 See BIOMETRICS POST-9/l 1, supra note 127, at 18 (stating that the initial maximum distance for
recognition of cooperative subjects, under controlled illumination was less than ten feet, but by the
program's end in 2003, that distance had increased to 150 feet).
"6 See id. ("[T]he HurnanilD program made significant gains in understanding the difficulties
associated with biometric technology and provided the ground work for numerous future biometric
research programs.").
" Id. at 25.
165 Id.
166 p. JONATHON PHILLIPS ET AL., THE IRIS CHALLENGE EVALUATION 2005 § ViII (2008),
http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/getpdf.cfm?pubid=890057.http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/getLp
df.cfm?pub id=890057 [https://perma.cc/2ZUL-BRPC].
167 Iris Challenge Evaluation (ICE), NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/iris-challenge-evaluation-ice [https://perma.cc/8HAX-BHJS]
(last visited Feb. 6, 2017). Phase I presented the iris challenge problem, and Phase II measured
technology performance using a "standard dataset and test methodology." Id.
' See supra note 158 (asserting that the iris recognition pilot program provides CJIS the means
for continual assessment and development of privacy policy, image capture best practices, camera
requirements, image compression specifications, and image quality metrics).
"9 See BIOMETRICS POST-9/1 l, supra note 127, at 25. Various examples of interagency database
cooperation cited include discovery of insurgents applying for selection to the Iraqi Police Academy, and
matching foreign detainees to U.S. felony records. Id
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of this technology has correspondingly improved public safety. National
security is a largely convincing justification for mass data-collection,
retention, and sharing. But the strategy for gathering such information, as
well as the duration of its storage, should be clearly defined and narrowly
tailored to achieving that end. Similarly, measures to restrict the transfer of
biometric information among government agencies should be implemented
to limit incursions on privacy.
There appears to be a growing host of entities interested in and
motivated to share biometric information.'7 0 Although government agencies
constitute a major portion of that group,'71 industry and academia have also
made major contributions to the research, development, testing and
evaluation of iris recognition technology.' 7 2 The use of a common
infrastructure, coupled with NGI's integration and indexing of multimodal
biometric data, continues to expand the practical limits of iris recognition
technology.
III. IRIS RECOGNITION AND THE LAW
It remains to be seen whether iris recognition will be determined to
constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, despite
the fact that it does not entail a bodily intrusion. Iris scanning involves
controversial legal issues implicating constitutional safeguards as well as
larger public-policy concerns.1 73  Given the pervasive integration of
biometric scanning into government programs, these legal and policy
concerns must be addressed. To fill the regulatory gap, we first need to
define iris recognition in legal terms, and then decide whether its benefits
"o See id. at 13 ("All federal biometrics RDT&E is closely prioritized and coordinated through the
[National Science and Technology Council] Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management and
often involves joint sponsorship and project management from multiple agencies.").
17' Biometrics, DEPT. HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.govlbiometrics [https://perma.cc/7BDZ-
LZP9] (last visited April 20, 2017) (listing the Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Defense, Department of Justice, and Department of State as government agencies that collect and share
biometric information); Robyn Caplan et al., Biometric Technologies in Policing, DATA & CIVIL
RIGHTS: A NEW ERA OF POLICING AND JUSTICE 1, 3 (Oct. 27, 2015)
http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/BiometricsPrimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVS3-
2WMK] ("Collection of biometric data is not restricted to any one government agency, and is occurring
at the local and state level, as well as through federal agencies such as the ... FBI, DEA, NSA, TSA
and others .... Data is also increasingly being shared between these different levels of government,
and between agencies.").
172 BIOMETRICS POST-9/1 1, supra note 127, at 79; see also West Virginia University Named
National Leader for FBI Biometrics Research: WVU-FBI Partner on Biometric Center of Excellence,
FBI (Feb. 6, 2008), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/west-virginia-
university-named-national-leader-for-fbi-biometrics-research [https://perma.cc/ME7L-BECC]
("WVU's role is to provide biometrics research support to the FBI and its law enforcement and national
security partners and serve as the FBI liaison to the academic community of biometric researchers
nationwide.").
"' Woodward, supra note 6, at 99, 115, 117, 121.
1384 CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW [Vol. 49:1357
IRIS RECOGNITION, FORENSICS, AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY
outweigh its costs. Only then can we choose to enforce those situations iris
recognition can be used, and those when it should be excluded.
A. Privacy
In their classic law review article The Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis popularized Judge Thomas M. Cooley's phrase
articulating privacy as "the right to be let alone."174 The text of the
Constitution does not define privacy, and the legal community has struggled
to adequately explain it. The term's lack of clarity is complicated by the fact
that it is a social construct,1 75 and our perception of privacy is constantly
evolving. Still, perhaps the most enduring thread in the concept of privacy
is the notion of control. Iris recognition technology and other biometrics
have the potential to allocate vast control to their users and to greatly
undermine that of the subjects. As a threshold matter, we must resolve
whether iris recognition is compatible with maintaining privacy.
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized three distinct forms of
privacy: physical, decisional, and informational." 6 Physical privacy is
typically understood to be "freedom from contact with other people or
monitoring agents."l 77 Decisional privacy has been defined as freedom to
make private choices about personal and intimate matters without undue
government interference. 178 Informational privacy involves the freedom to
limit others' access to certain personal information. 179 The "personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education," 80 relating to decisional privacy
are not clearly implicated by iris scanning technology. We will consider, in
turn, the effect of iris recognition technology on physical and informational
privacy.
1. Physical Privacy & the Fourth Amendment
Although some iris scanning may involve voluntary enrollment for
convenience or other purposes, government-mandated biometrics threaten
to violate physical privacy. The Fourth Amendment, which governs searches
and seizures conducted by government agents, provides physical privacy in
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
174 Id. at 120.
17 Id. at 117-21; see also RICHARD C. TURKNGTON ET AL., PRVACY: CASES AND MATERIALS 35
(1992) ("Law mirrors the society that creates it.").
176 Woodward, supra note 6, at 122.
" Id.; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(describing physical privacy).
71 Woodward, supra note 6, at 122.
179 Id.
"' Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (discussing the Court's recognition of the right to privacy).
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and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated."18 ' By its very nature, iris scanning qualifies as a search in terms
of the Fourth Amendment.1 82
Courts have looked to three situational aspects in determining a search's
constitutionality: The nature of the intrusion, the scope of intrusiveness, and
"reasonableness."' Blood-drawing, DNA collection, breathalyzer tests,
and urinalysis have all been held to constitute Fourth Amendment
searches. 8 4 Also, a search need not involve an actual penetration of the
body."' Despite the fact that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
facial characteristics "constantly exposed to the public,"'86 the process of
storing, retrieving, and analyzing an IrisCode can independently qualify as
a search because of the depth of inspection it allows.' 8 7
Facial and iris recognition differ for the purpose of Fourth Amendment
searches because of the operative gulf between facial- and iris-recognition
technologies, which creates disparate privacy consequences. Facial
recognition remains a central problem in computer vision because the
existing technology cannot infer from images what humans can: the 3D
arrangement of objects from their mutual occlusions; object surface
181 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
182 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that an
individual must have an actual expectation of privacy (subjective test) and that expectation must be
reasonable under the circumstances (objective test)); but see Christopher R. Jones, Note, "EyePhones ":
A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into Mobile Iris Scanning, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 925, 947 (concluding that, in
the context of police officers' use of mobile iris-scanning technology, a search would not occur under
current Supreme Court jurisprudence).
1.3 Woodward, supra note 6, at 124; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654,
658, 660 (1995) (considering factors including: the nature of the privacy interest, the character of the
intrusion, the information the intrusion discloses, and the nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern, in determining a search's constitutionality).
18 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989) ("We have long recognized
that a 'compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content' must be deemed
a Fourth Amendment search.... Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the
production of alveolar or 'deep lung' breath for chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about
bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test ... should also be deemed a search.... [lt is clear that
the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized
as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these
intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.") (internal citation omitted);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (stating the Fourth Amendment's proper function
is to constrain against intrusions into the body which are not justified); United States v. Mitchell, 652
F.3d 387, 406 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasizing DNA collections are subject to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment).
... See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 ("[lit is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath
the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy . .. [but] [t]he ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to
obtain physiological data is a further invasion of... privacy interests... .Nor can it be disputed that the
process of collecting the sample to be tested ... itself implicates privacy interests.").
8 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
1 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (arguing that the scraping of dried blood from
underneath fingernails is a search because it allowed closer laboratory examination than normal public
view).
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properties, such as texture and color; depth and volumetric object properties
from their 2D images; structure from motion, shading, texture, shadows, 3D
shape from a 2D line drawing; recognizing a 3D object regardless of its
rotation in 3D space; and understanding a novel object."' These difficulties
are apart from the separate problem that faces (unlike irises) change
significantly with age, expression, makeup, speaking, and so on. Compared
to iris recognition, facial recognition technology is abysmally inaccurate and
unreliable. For example, a computer cannot match a front and side view of
the same face (a task which a person could perform easily),'8 9 whereas a
computer can match an iris image to the correct IrisCode from amongst
millions of templates.9 0
Both the face and the eyes upon it are normally publicly exposed. But
because iris recognition technology allows for acquisition, storage, retrieval,
and analysis of personally identifying data, an iris scan independently
qualifies as a search where a facial scan does not. Additionally, public facial
exposure is a social norm in most cultures,' 9' its acceptance probably due, to
the face's function as an expressive and communicative organ. But despite
the Supreme Court's decision in Dionisio 92 that there is no expectation of
privacy in facial features exposed in public' 9 3 -of which the eyes and iris
are a part-there is actually more privacy inherent to facial features than iris
pattern.
Due to the constraints of automated facial recognition discussed above,
there are limits to the information generated by public exposure of one's
face. Facial recognition performed by humans is a function of audience
familiarity with the subject's face. Conversely, a single inadvertent exposure
of one's irises to scanners is sufficient to extinguish anonymity. Because
iris-recognition technology is familiarity independent (once
identified=always identifiable), has nearly infallible recall, has potentially
broad resources, and examines subjects in far greater detail than the human
eye or other biometrics, it threatens physical privacy in a way that facial
recognition does not. Since public awareness of iris recognition is limited,
an average person would not reasonably expect (either subjectively or
objectively) to be identifiable amongst a crowd of strangers. Thus iris
'" DAUGMAN, supra note 46, at 5-7.
8 See id at 4 (discussing a computer's issues with facial recognition).
isoSupra Section I.B.1.
19 Some notable exceptions include the niqab, a traditional face covering worn by some women in
the Muslim faith, and the veil worn by Tuareg men over the age of 25, both of which conceal the entire
face except for the eyes. What's the Difference Between a Hifab, Niqab and Burka?, BBC (June 18,
2015, www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/24118241 [https://perma.cc/E8MW-DY3R]; Andrew Meldrum,
Tuaregs: 5 Things You Need to Know, PUB. RADIO INT'L (Oct. 29, 2011,
https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-10-29/tuaregs-5-things-you-need-know [https://perma.cc/4NMK-
PXXH].
192 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973).
'93 Id. at 14.
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recognition, despite requiring no bodily contact and involving publicly
exposed features, can reasonably be construed to be a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
To ascertain reasonableness, courts must balance the "intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."l94 Also, a search is deemed "'reasonable' only if
the police have probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity."l95 But a search warrant may not even come into play. Valid
government interests such as counter-terrorism, border control, and proper
allocation of government-funded benefits could theoretically provide law
enforcement the ideal pretext for dragnet scanning of virtually the entire
population. This scenario would undermine the Fourth Amendment's core
animating purpose and endanger other civil rights that depend on the liberty
and privacy that it ensures.196
2. Informational Privacy
The right to informational privacy can be understood as "the claim of
individuals ... to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others." 97 Unrestricted use of
iris recognition to indiscriminately collect, indefinitely store, and widely
disseminate citizens' information in large, centralized databases violates the
autonomy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'9 Other constitutional
protections threatened include the Fifth Amendment right against forced
revelation of private information and the implicit First Amendment right
against disclosure of private associations. 199 Although the Supreme Court in
1965 formally acknowledged a constitutional right to privacy drawn from
"' Woodward, supra note 6, at 124.
'` Id; see also Casey A. Taylor, The Fiction ofPrivacy Under the Fourth Amendment: Examining
Warrantless Cell Phone Searches in the Context ofRiley v. California, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 395, 398 (2015)
(asserting that the government bears the burden of showing the permissibility of a warrantless search, if
a search was found to be conducted in an area one expects, by reasonable societal standards, to be
private).
19 See, e.g., Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 255, 264 (1961) (stating that all other freedoms depend on the preexistence
of security and privacy).
'9 Alan F. Westin, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN
FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 6 (2000)
("[Privacy] is the desire by each of us for physical space where we can be free of interruption, intrusion,
embarrassment, or accountability and the attempt to control the time and manner of disclosures of
personal information about ourselves. In the first half of our history, Americans seemed to pursue the
first, physical privacy; in the second half-after the Civil War Americans seemed in pursuit of the
second, 'information privacy."').
19' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
'" Id. amend. V; id amend. I.
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the "zones" of freedom created by these individual rights, 2 00 it has chosen to
defer to the legislature despite its concern that emerging biometric
technologies, like iris recognition, might erode informational privacy.20 '
Informational privacy concerns the use of information pertaining to an
individual, particularly "the extent of the individual's authority to control
how that information is used . . . and the corresponding responsibility of
other individuals and organizations to include the individual in decision-
making processes that drive subsequent use."202 The impetus behind the
emergence of informational privacy (as distinct from physical privacy) was
the simultaneous advent of new technology and increasing demand for
personal information.2 03 These two events merged to form the backdrop
against which Warren and Brandeis asserted an individual right to prevent
unintended publication of personal information.2 0
Personal information is defined as "any information that could be used
to identify an individual."2 05 Biometric information, such as IrisCodes, is
personal information due to both content (collected from observation of
individuals) and use (general purpose of biometrics is recognition of
individuals).2 06 Thus, when biometrics are collected, personal information is
always involved and privacy interests are necessarily triggered. Regardless
of the intent behind collection,20 7 ongoing privacy assessments should be
conducted to analyze the potential impact of iris scans on individual privacy
interests. A comprehensive privacy assessment would begin with direct use
of information gained from iris scans (i.e., iris image, IrisCode) and continue
with a thorough investigation of all subsequent uses of that data for
200 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("Specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance .. . [v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy.")
201 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) ("We are not unaware of the threat to privacy
implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other
massive government files... . The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.").
202 NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL ET AL., PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATION 26, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=463913 [https://perma.cc/YJE7-GAUK] (last
updated Sept. 15, 2006) [hereinafter PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS].
203 Id. at 28 ("Earlier cameras were large and slow and required the intentional participation of the
subject. The new cameras were smaller and faster and made it easy for one individual to photograph
another without permission or even awareness. At the same time, 'gossip' newspapers erupted in
popularity creating a vacuum for content about individual personal lives."). Both the emergence of new
technology, such as iris recognition, and increasing demand for personal information translate readily to
modem times.
204 Id
205 Id. at 34.
206 See id at 35 (defining biometric information).
207 Privacy entails the freedom to make personal decisions without unwarranted government
interference. See Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 679 (Tex. 1976)
("It is also apparent that the right of privacy is primarily a restraint upon unwarranted governmental
interference or intrusion into those areas deemed to be within the protected 'zones of privacy."').
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identification of individuals.208
Individuals may choose to forfeit their informational privacy by
informed consent to iris scanning. But if individuals do not voluntarily
submit to iris scanning, they should not be deprived of other rights in
exercising their right to informational privacy. To ensure the protection of
privacy interests, an organization administering an iris recognition system
or making decisions based on data collected should be subject to external
auditing. Absent specific common-law requirements for informed consent
to iris scanning, it falls to the legislature to enact a statute or direct
regulation. The following subsection of this Note will focus on suggested
guidelines for the contours of such legislation.
B. The Future
As a matter of public policy, legislation that regulates the use of iris
recognition technology should be clearly articulated, disclosed in advance,
and narrowly tailored to the original purpose. Legally founded deployment
of iris scanning should specifically circumscribe appropriate contexts, extent
of use, and access to collected information. Further, the authority collecting,
using, or sharing the data must continually demonstrate a legitimate need for
such information, and that the data is both within the scope and in significant
furtherance of the original purpose.
In theory, this seems fairly straightforward, but in practice, iris
recognition presents several challenges. First, tracking of individuals by
government or other entities under the penumbra of "security" would be
difficult for an average citizen to detect, let alone challenge.209 Conspicuous
compliance measures, such as statutorily mandated signage and
documentation of notice, would likely improve transparency. Second, iris-
recognition systems may exist in multiple jurisdictions (federal, state, local),
and may even cross international boundaries. 210 Effective legislation would
therefore require harmonization with each jurisdiction's relevant laws. For
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United
Nations (and implicitly, by its member states) recognizes: "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy.. . . Everyone has the
208 See PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS, supra note 202, at 35 (arguing a privacy assessment "should start
with direct use of biometric information and expand to cover all uses of data that become part of an
identification and decision-making process.").
209 See, e.g., Iris Scanners Can Now Identify Us From 40 Feet Away, CONVERSATION (May 21,
2015), https://theconversation.com/iris-scanners-can-now-identify-us-from-40-feet-away-42141
[https://perma.cc/4GED-BGE6] (noting that researchers were able to obtain driver's iris scans from the
reflection in their vehicle's side mirror).
210 Jurisdictional overlap may occur through a system's physical equipment, the information it
contains, the individuals using or benefitting from it, and/or the individuals related to information that it
uses. PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS, supra note 202, at 32-33.
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right to the protection of the law against such interference. ... "211 Third,
there are small but tangible gaps in accuracy and reliability at various levels
of iris-recognition technology, including biographic information linking,
image-to-template conversion, and matching statistics.212 Because a
possibility exists that a probable match is not an actual match,2 13 legislation
must allow for individuals to dispute matching decisions, and request erasure
of incorrect data.
There are also many considerations in determining iris recognition's
applicability: environment, security and throughput needs, desired task
(identification versus verification), associated costs, interoperability, and
user acceptance. Despite these challenges, iris recognition technology must
be addressed in order to achieve valid objectives without eradicating privacy
interests. Iris-recognition systems are rapidly growing in use around the
world by law enforcement agencies and the commercial sector, creating the
potential for a "digitally efficient investigative state." 214 Existing legislation
such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the
E-Government Act of 2002,1 can help provide a foundation in determining
the necessary architecture to ensure individual privacy protection.
CONCLUSION
Iris recognition technology is being implemented right now in a growing
number of industrial and governmental settings.21  This biometric has
already begun to cause high-order disruptive change to social perception of
privacy, which will likely continue. The first step in enabling coexistence of
iris recognition technology and personal privacy is deciding what we want
our collective future to look like. There will always be a tension between
security and privacy-the challenge remains to find a balance and accept the
sacrifice required to maintain it. Iris recognition should be thoughtfully and
minimally deployed in order to mutually protect privacy and promote
security to the greatest extent practicable.
211 G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. XII (Dec. 10, 1948).
212 PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS, supra note 202, at 7-9.
213 Daugman, supra note 25, at 27.
214 Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 281, 284 (2011).
215 The Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (2012)) provides near-universal access to any government record; The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)) contains principles surrounding
government collection, use, and maintenance of personal information; and The E-Government Act of
2002 requires government agencies to conduct assessments of information technology use and privacy
impact. PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS, supra note 202, at 38 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3601 (2002)).
216 SRI INT'L, supra note 67, at 2 ("Amsterdam's Schiphol and other airports use iris recognition to
provide self-service passport control; law enforcement agencies across the U.S. use it to identify people;
hospitals and mandatory drug testing labs use it to ensure patient identity; countries such as India are
implementing nationwide iris identification initiatives; enterprises such as Google use iris recognition to
control physical access.").
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